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Abstract
Most recent software related accidents have been sys-
tem accidents. To validate the absence of system hazards
concerning dysfunctional interactions, industrials call for
approaches of modeling system safety requirements and
interaction constraints among components and with envi-
ronments (e.g., between humans and machines). This paper
proposes a framework based on input/output constraint
meta-automata, which restricts system behavior at the meta
level. This approach can formally model safe interactions
between a system and its environment or among its com-
ponents. This framework differs from the framework of the
traditional model checking. It explicitly separates the tasks
of product engineers and safety engineers, and provides
a top-down technique for modeling a system with safety
constraints, and for automatically composing a safe system
that conforms to safety requirements. The contributions of
this work include formalizing system safety requirements and
a way of automatically ensuring system safety.
1. System Accidents
Computer technology has created a quiet revolution in
most fields of engineering, also introduced new failure
modes that are changing the nature of accidents [1]. To
provide much more complex automated services, industrials
have to develop much more complicated computer systems
which consist of numerous components and a huge number
of actions (both internal and interactive). A recent challenge
is the system accident, caused by increasing coupling among
system components (software, control system, electrome-
chanical and human), and their interactive complexity [2][3].
In contrast, accidents arising from component failures are
termed component failure accidents.
System safety and component reliability are different.
They are system property and component property, respec-
tively [2]. Reliability is defined as the probability that a
component satisfies its specified behavioral requirements,
whereas safety is defined as the absence of accidents —
events involving an unacceptable loss [4]. People are now
constructing intellectually unmanageable software systems
that go beyond human cognitive limits, and this allows
potentially unsafe interactions to be undetected. Accidents
often result from hazardous interactions among perfectly
functioning components.
There are several examples of system accidents.
The space shuttle Challenger accident was due to the
release of hot propellant gases from a field joint. An O-
ring was used to control the hazard by sealing a tiny gap in
the field joint created by pressure at ignition. However, the
design did not effectively impose the required constraints
on the propellant gas release (i.e., it did not adequately seal
the gap), leading to an explosion and the loss of the shuttle
and its crew [5].
The self-destructing explosion of Ariane 5 launcher was
resulted from the successive failures of the active inertial
reference system (IRS) and the backup IRS [5]. Ariane 5
adopted the same reference system as Ariane 4. However,
the profile of Ariane 5 was different from that of Ariane 4
— the acceleration communicated as input value to IRS of
Ariane 5 was higher. Furthermore, the interactions between
IRS and other components were not checked and redefined.
Due to the overflow of input value computation, the IRS
stopped working [6]. Then, the signaled error was interpreted
as a launcher attitude, and led the control system to rotate
the tailpipe at the end stop [7].
The loss of the Mars Polar Lander was attributed to a
misapprehensive interaction between the onboard software
and the landing leg system [8]. The landing leg system was
expected and specified to generate noise (spurious signals)
when the landing legs were deployed during descent. How-
ever, the onboard software interpreted these signals as an
indication that landing occurred (as specified in their require-
ments) and shut the engines down, causing the spacecraft to
crash into the Mars surface.
A system accident occurred in a batch chemical reactor
in England [9]. The computer controlled the input flow of
cooling water into the condenser and the input flow of
catalyst into the reactor by manipulating the valves. The
computer was told that if any component in the plant gets
abnormal, it had to leave all controlled variables as they were
Figure 1. A Chemical Reactor Design
and to sound an alarm. On one occasion, the computer just
started to increase the cooling water flow, after a catalyst had
been added into the reactor. Then the computer received an
abnormal signal indicating a low oil level in a gearbox, and
it reacted as its requirements specified: sounded an alarm
and maintained all the control variables with their present
condition. Since the water flow was kept at a low rate,
then the reactor overheated, the relief valve lifted and the
contents of the reactor were discharged into the atmosphere.
The design of the system is shown in Fig. 1.
In all these accidents, the components are reliable in
terms of satisfying their specified requirements, but the
systems are not safe as a whole. As Leveson mentioned in
STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes)
[1], these accidents result from inadequate control or en-
forcement of safety-related constraints of the systems.
Since most software related accidents have been system
accidents [1], people need to model and constrain inter-
actions of system components to validate the absence of
dysfunctional interactions. One of the challenges to system
safety is that the ambiguity in safety requirements may lead
to reliable unsafe systems. Another challenge is the lack of
formal techniques for describing safety rules and interac-
tions between components (including interactions between
humans and machines), which makes automated verifications
difficult. In this paper, we will propose a formal framework
for modeling system safety rules. The framework is based
on a new concept of I/O constraint meta-automata.
This paper is organized as follows: the framework of our
approach is proposed in Section 2. The formal technique
based on I/O constraint meta-automata is introduced in
Section 3. An example is used to illustrate how to formalize
safety constraints and combine it with a system specification.
In Section 4, we discuss how to apply this approach to
a system that consists of multiple components. In Section
5, we compare our works to classic verification techniques,
such as model checking, and conclude the paper.
2. The Framework of Our Approach
The most popular technique of system safety verification
is model checking [10]. In this framework, we have two
steps in verifying a system. At first, we formalize system
behavior as a model (e.g., a transition system, a Kripke
model [11]). At the second step, we specify the features that
we aim at validating, and use a certain checking algorithm
to search for a counterexample which is an execution trace
violating the specified features. If the algorithm finds such
a counterexample, we have to modify the original system to
ensure safety requirements, or else the verification succeeds.
Unlike the model checking, our framework takes another
way. It consists of the following steps:
1) Modeling system behavior, including specifications of
its components, internal and external interactions.
2) Modeling system safety constraints using a certain
formal technique, e.g., I/O constraint meta-automata
in this paper.
3) Combining these two models to deduce a safe system
model, that is, a system model whose behavior is in
accordance with its safety constraints.
As we mentioned in [12], the system behavior specifies
an operational semantics, which defines what a system is
able to do. Modeling system behavior is mainly performed
by product engineers (designers), such as programmers and
developers. In the example of the chemical reactor control
system, the actions “opening the catalyst flow”, “opening
the cooling water flow” and “sounding an alarm” are system
behaviors.
In the second step, the model of safety requirements
specifies a correctness semantics, which defines what a
system is authorized to do. This process is the duty of safety
engineers whose responsibility is to assure system safety.
Safety engineers may consist of requirement engineers, test
engineers, managers from higher socio-technical levels who
define safety standards or regulations [1], etc. In the example
of the chemical reactor system, the constraint “opening the
catalyst flow must be followed by opening the cooling water
flow” is an instance of system safety requirements.
In the third step, in order to ensure system safety, we
combine the system model with its safety constraints model.
Then we can check if the system is safe under the constraints
specifying safety requirements. However, the precondition
of such a formal checking is that we must formalize safety
requirements. And we also need to carefully define the
composition of a system model and its constraints model. In
the next section, we will introduce such an approach based
on I/O constraint meta-automata.
We remark here that an other precondition is that we can
find all safety constraints in a system. However, this is an
issue of “risk identification” [13], which is outside the scope
of this paper. This work deals with “risk treatment”, which
is a different phase to risk identification, according to the
ISO Standard 31000 [13].
3. Modeling System Safety Constraints Using
I/O Constraint Meta-Automata
The theory of input/output automata [14][15] extends
classic automata theory [16] for modeling concurrent sys-
tems with different input, output and internal actions. I/O
automata and the variants are widely used in modeling
distributed systems [17].
Definition 1: An input/output automaton (also called
an I/O automaton or simply an automaton) is a tuple
A = (Q,ΣI ,ΣO,ΣH , δ, S), where:
• Q is a set of states.
• ΣI ,ΣO,ΣH are pairwise disjoint sets of input, out-
put and internal actions, respectively. Let Σ =
ΣI
⋃
ΣO
⋃
ΣH be the set of actions.
• δ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is a set of labeled transitions, such
that for each a ∈ ΣI and q ∈ Q there is a transition
pk : (q, a, q
′) ∈ δ (input-enabled).
• S ⊆ Q is a nonempty set of start states. 
In the graph notation, a transition pk : (q, a, q′) is denoted
by an arc from q to q′ labeled pk : a, where pk is the name
of the transition. To discriminate explicitly the different sets
of actions in diagrams, we may suffix a symbol “?”, “!” or
“;” to an input, output or internal action, respectively.
In the example of the batch chemical reactor, the computer
system behavior is modeled using an I/O automaton A
of Fig. 2(1). The automaton A includes a set of input
actions ΣI = {l} (low oil signal), a set of output actions
ΣO = {c, w, a} (opening catalyst flow, opening water flow,
sounding an alarm, respectively), and a set of internal actions
ΣH = {e} (ending all operations). The normal operational
behavior includes opening catalyst flow (p1), then opening
water flow (p2), etc., resulting in an infinite execution trace
p1p2p1p2.... To respond to abnormal signals as soon as
possible, all the states have a transition labeled l, which
leads to a state that can sound an alarm (p6) and stop the
process (p8). Unfortunately, this design leads to hazardous
behaviors: (cw)∗clae, that is, after a sequence of opening
catalyst and water flows (cw)∗, then the catalyst flow is
opened c when an abnormal signal is received l, then an
alarm is sounded a. So water is not added after the catalyst
flow is opened. This sequence of events leads to the accident
mentioned in Section 1.
Note that this hazard is due to the uncontrolled sequences
of transitions — p1 must be followed by p2 and not by p4.
To solve this problem, we need to specify the authorized
sequences (satisfying safety constraints) on the transitions
δ and not on the actions Σ. Thus, these constraints are
not at the behavioral model level, but at the meta-model
level. We propose the concept of constraint meta-automata
to formalize safety constraints. Then, we combine a meta-
automaton with the system automaton.
Definition 2: A constraint meta-automaton (or simply
meta-automaton) Aˆ over an I/O automaton A = (Q,Σ, δ, S)
is a tuple Aˆ = (Qˆ, Σˆ, δˆ, Sˆ), where:
• Qˆ is a set of states disjoint with Q.
• Σˆ is a set of terminals that consists of all the transition
names in δ of A.
• δˆ is a set of labeled transitions.
• Sˆ ⊆ Qˆ is a nonempty set of start states. 
Note that the transitions δ of A are terminals of Aˆ, so we
say that Aˆ is at the meta level of A. Figure 3 illustrates the 3
levels in our framework. Let Σ∗ be a set of execution traces
of actions, A describes the behavior on Σ. Aˆ specifies the
behavior on the A-transitions (Σˆ = δ), that is, a behavior
on the behavior of A. This meta-behavior expresses safety
requirements.
Σ∗
Σ
A
δ
Aˆ
A′
(execution traces)
Level L1
(system behavior)
Level L2
(safety requirements)
Level L3
Figure 3. A 3-levels Overview
In the example, to prevent accidents, we need to bind
the safety constraint “opening catalyst must be followed
by opening water,” that is, “whenever the transition p1 : c
occurs, the transition p2 : w must occur after that.” This
constraint can be formalized as a constraint meta-automaton
Aˆ of Fig. 2(2). When we design this constraint, we only
specify the sequence of transitions p1, p2 at the meta-model
level, and we concern little about the implementation of the
system at the model level. The next step is to compose the
system automaton A with its constraint meta-automaton Aˆ,
and automatically generate a system model A′ satisfying the
safety requirement.
Definition 3: The meta-composition A′ of an I/O au-
tomaton A = (Q,Σ, δ, S) and a constraint meta-automaton
Aˆ = (Qˆ, Σˆ, δˆ, Sˆ) over A is a tuple:
A′ = A−→· Aˆ = (Q× Qˆ,Σ, δ′, S × Sˆ) (1)
where pk : ((qi, qˆj), a, (qm, qˆn)) ∈ δ′ iff,
(1) pk : (qi, a, qm) ∈ δ, and
(2) (qˆj , pk, qˆn) ∈ δˆ. 
The symbol −→· is the meta-composition operator, and
read as “meta-compose”. Its left and right operands are an
automaton and a constraint meta-automaton, respectively.
Notice that δ = {pk}k∈K plays a key role in associating
transitions of A and terminals of Aˆ. For our example, we
combine the automata A and Aˆ of Fig. 2, thus we get the
automaton A′ = A−→· Aˆ of Fig. 4 where qij denotes (qi, qˆj).
q0
q1
q2 q3 q4p1 : c!p2 : w!
p3 : l?
p4 : l?
p5 : l?
p6 : a!
p7 : l?
p8 : e;
p9 : l?
(1)A
qˆ0 qˆ1
{pi}2≤i≤9
p1
p2
(2)Aˆ
Figure 2. Automata of the Reactor Control System
q00
q11
q20 q30 q40p1 : c!p2 : w!
p3 : l?
p5 : l?
p6 : a!
p7 : l?
p8 : e;
p9 : l?
Figure 4. The Meta-Composition A′
The meta-composition contains exactly all the paths sat-
isfying the constraint in the system. Formally, we have the
following theorem (the proof is omitted for its simpleness
and intuitiveness from the definition):
Theorem 4: Given A, Aˆ and the meta-composition A′, an
execution trace tΣ ∈ Σ∗ is in A′ iff, tΣ is in A, and its
transition trace tδ ∈ δ∗ is in Aˆ. 
Obviously, the set of traces of A′ is a subset of the traces
of A. Formally, let L(A) be the set of traces of A (also the
language of A), we have L(A′) ⊆ L(A).
Thanks to Aˆ, the hazardous execution traces, for example
cwclae, which exists in A, will be eliminated, because its
transition trace p1p2p1p4p6p8 6∈ L(Aˆ) (the language of Aˆ).
The comparison between A of Fig. 2(1) and A′ of Fig. 4
highlights the hazardous transition p4 of A. However, in
general, this diagnosis is much more complex and cannot be
achieved manually, since a real system A has too many states
to be expressed clearly on a paper. That is why we should
provide a formal and automated method for eliminating
hazardous transitions.
4. Modeling Multi-Component Systems with
Safety Constraints
Our approach can also be applied to the systems that are
made up of several components, whose safety constraints
are related to several components.
As a preliminary, we redefine the composition of I/O
automata, which was introduced in [14].
Let N = {n1, ..., nk} ⊆ N be a finite set with cardinality
k, and for each n ∈ N , Sn be a set. Then we define:∏
n∈N Sn
def
= {(xn1 , xn2 , ..., xnk) | (∀j ∈ {1, ..., k} • xnj ∈
Snj ) ∧ N = {n1, ..., nk} ∧ (∀j1, j2 ∈ {1, ..., k} • j1 <
j2 → nj1 < nj2)}. We define the function of projection
−→s [j] to denote the j-th component of the state vector −→s :
∀j ∈ {1, ..., k}, (xn1 , xn2 , ..., xnk)[j] = xnj .
Definition 5: A finite collection of I/O automata
{An}n∈N is said to be strongly compatible if ∀i, j ∈ N ,
i 6= j, we have
(1) ΣOi ∩ ΣOj = ∅, and
(2) ΣHi ∩ Σj = ∅. 
Definition 6: The composition A = ∏n∈N An of a finite
collection of strongly compatible I/O automata {An}n∈N
is an I/O automaton (
∏
n∈N Qn,Σ
I ,ΣO,ΣH , δ,
∏
n∈N Sn)
iff,
• ΣI =
⋃
n∈N Σ
I
n −
⋃
n∈N Σ
O
n ,
• ΣO =
⋃
n∈N Σ
O
n ,
• ΣH =
⋃
n∈N Σ
H
n , and
• for each −→q ,−→q ′ ∈
∏
n∈N Qn and a ∈ Σ,
pI : (
−→q , a,−→q ′) ∈ δ iff ∀j : 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | ∧ nj ∈ N ,
1) if a ∈ Σnj then
∃i : i ⊆ I • pi : (
−→q [j], a,−→q ′[j]) ∈ δnj ;
2) if a 6∈ Σnj then −→q [j] = −→q ′[j] and
∀i : pi ∈ δnj • i ∩ I = ∅. 
Notice that the name of a transition of A may contain a
set of names of original transitions pI = {pi}i⊆I , where i
may be a set or a single element.
We use an example derived from [14], concerning a
system composed of two components with interactions: a
candy vending machine and a customer. The candy ma-
chine Am, specified in Fig. 5(1), may receive inputs b1, b2
indicating that buttons 1 and 2 are pushed, respectively.
It may output s, a, indicating candy dispensation actions,
SKYBARs and ALMONDJOYs, respectively. The machine
may receive several inputs before delivering a candy. A
greedy user Au, specified in Fig. 5(2), can push buttons
b1, b2 or get a candy s, a. The greedy user does not wait for
a candy bar before pressing a button again.
The composition of the machine behavior and the user
behavior is defined by Amu = Am ·Au of Fig. 5(3), where
qij denotes the composite state (mi, uj), pi1,...,ik denotes
a set of transitions {pi1 , pi2 , . . . , pik}. A transition of the
composition may be composed of several transitions of com-
ponents. For example, p1,15 : s is a synchronization of p1 : s!
and p15 : s?, which belong to Am and Au, respectively.
Formally, a transition of A =
∏
n∈N An may be composed
of i transitions of components, where 1 ≤ i ≤ |N |.
In the context of composite transitions, a composite tran-
sition is allowed iff one of its sub-transitions is authorized
by its constraint meta-automaton. Thus, we define the meta-
composition operator as follows:
Definition 7: The meta-composition A′ of a composition
A =
∏
n∈N An = (
∏
n∈N Qn,Σ, δ,
∏
n∈N Sn) and a
constraint meta-automaton Aˆ = (Qˆ, Σˆ, δˆ, Sˆ) over A is a
tuple:
A′ = A−→· Aˆ = ((
∏
n∈N
Qn)× Qˆ,Σ, δ
′, (
∏
n∈N
Sn)× Sˆ) (2)
where pI : ((−→qi , qˆj), a, (−→qm, qˆn)) ∈ δ′ iff,
(1) pI : (−→qi , a,−→qm) ∈ δ, and
(2) ∃k : k ∈ I • (qˆj , pk, qˆn) ∈ δˆ. 
Notice that the specification of the example allows a haz-
ardous situation: the greedy user repeatedly pushes a single
button without giving the machine a chance to dispense
a candy bar (the transition labeled p5,13 : b1 of q11 does
not allow the transition (q11, s, q00) to be fired). To prevent
this situation, the following constraints forbid successive
occurrences of pressing a single button:
• Whenever one of the transitions p3, p5, p7 (action b1)
occurs, the next transition must be not p3, p5, p7.
• Whenever one of the transitions p4, p6, p8 (action b2)
occurs, the next transition must be not p4, p6, p8.
Differing from the previous example, the constraint needs
to synchronize the actions of the machine and of the user.
Formalizing the constraints, the semantics of the con-
straint meta-automaton Ac of Fig. 6(1) is: whenever the user
pushes a button, she or he cannot push it again, but may push
the other button to change the choice, or wait for a candy
bar.
Combining the whole system Amu with its constraint
Ac, we get the system A′ = (Am · Au)−→· Ac in Fig. 6(2),
where qijk denotes the composite state (mi, uj, ck). All of
its execution traces satisfy the constraint, and thus prevent
the hazardous situation.
This simple example is good for demonstrating the prin-
ciple, avoiding indigestible diagrams of automata. Since we
formally defined the meta-composition operator, it can be
easily implemented to be an automated tool. Thus, it can be
applied to more complex systems.
5. Conclusion
We propose modeling system safety requirements for-
mally using I/O constraint meta-automata. As we illustrated
using the examples, this approach can formally model safe
interactions between a system and its environments, or
among its components. This framework differs from the
one of the traditional model checking. It explicitly separates
the tasks of product engineers and safety engineers, and
provides a technique for modeling a system with safety
constraints, and for automatically composing a safe system
that conforms to safety requirements.
The essential ideas of our approach are the separation
and formalization of the system specification A (behavioral
requirements) and the safety constraints Aˆ (safety require-
ments). The automaton A handles inputs to produce outputs
using activities depending on the states, whereas the meta-
automaton Aˆ treats activities to produce the set of acceptable
activities depending on safety requirements.
Our framework has different objective and uses different
approaches to those of model checking. Model checking
techniques use a bottom-up approach — it verifies execution
traces Σ∗ at the lower level L1 to prove the correctness and
safety of the system model A at the middle level L2 (see
Fig. 3). However, our proposal uses a top-down approach
— we model safety requirements as acceptable sequences of
transitions (δ∗) at the higher level L3 to ensure the correct
use of A. Then any execution trace (at L1) that conforms
to the meta-composition A′ is definitely a safe execution.
So the two techniques are complementary. Model checking
may be used to reduce the fault likelihood, and our approach
can be applied to avoid behavior that are not in accordance
with some critical safety requirements.
Both linear time logic and branching time logic have been
proved to be useful in checking properties of traces of classic
automata [10]. Since I/O automata are extended from classic
automata, these existing techniques can be easily applied to
I/O automata with little modifications.
In the future, we will apply the approach to the variants
of I/O automata, e.g., timed, hybrid, probabilistic, dynamic
[17]. Our approach can also be applied to the systems
specified using classic automata [16], since I/O automata
are specific extensions of traditional automata.
We will also study the formalization of parameterized con-
straints. To model parameterized systems more accurately,
parameters of actions and value domains of variables should
be considered. This is also the basis of studying reusability,
substitutability and equivalence of components.
As we mentioned, identification of potential hazards is
also a challenge in practice. Risk identification and treatment
are both important phases in risk management [13]. This will
be a good direction for future work.
References
[1] N. Leveson, “A new accident model for engineering safer
systems,” Safety Science, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 237–270, 2004.
[2] N. Leveson, “Applying systems thinking to analyze and learn
from events,” in Workshop NeTWorK 2008, 2008, available
from http://sunnyday.mit.edu/papers/network-08.doc.
m0
m1
m2
p1 : s!
p3 : b1?
p2 : a!
p4 : b2?
p5 : b1?
p6 : b2?
p7 : b1?
p8 : b2?
(1)Am
u0 u1
p9 : s?
p10 : a?
p11 : b1!
p12 : b2!
p13 : b1!
p14 : b2!
p15 : s?
p16 : a?
(2)Au
q00
q11
q21
p1,15 : s!
b1!
a!
b2!
p5,13 : b1!
p6,14 : b2!
b1!
b2!
(3)Amu
Figure 5. Automata of the Candy Machine System
c0
c2
c1
p1, p2
p1, p2
p4, p6, p8
p1, p2
p3, p5, p7
p4, p6, p8
p3, p5, p7
(1)Ac
q000
q111
q212
s!
b1!
a!
b2! b1!
b2!
(2)A′
Figure 6. A Safety Constraint of the Candy Machine System
[3] C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Tech-
nologies. Princetown University Press, USA, 1999.
[4] N. Leveson, Safeware: System Safety and Computers.
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1995.
[5] N. Leveson, “Evaluating accident models using recent
aerospace accidents,” Technical Report, MIT Dept.
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2001, available from
http://sunnyday.mit.edu/accidents.
[6] T. Kohda and Y. Takagi, “Accident cause analysis of complex
systems based on safety control functions,” in Proceedings
of Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS
’06), 2006, pp. 570–576.
[7] J.-C. Geffroy and G. Motet, Design of Dependable Computing
Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
[8] J. S. R. Board, “Report on the loss of the mars polar lander
and deep space 2 missions,” NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
2000.
[9] T. Kletz, “Human problems with computer control,”
Plant/Operations Progress, vol. 1, no. 4, 1982.
[10] E. M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D. A. Peled, Model Check-
ing. The MIT Press, 2000.
[11] M. Huth and M. Ryan, Logic in Computer Science: Modelling
and Reasoning about Systems, Second Edition. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[12] G. Motet, “Risks of faults intrinsic to software lan-
guages: Trade-off between design performance and applica-
tion safety,” Safety Science, 2009, to appear.
[13] ISO/DIS, ISO/DIS 31000: Risk management – Principles
and guidelines on implementation. International Standards
Organization, 2008.
[14] N. A. Lynch and M. R. Tuttle, “An introduction to in-
put/output automata,” CWI Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 3, pp.
219–246, 1989, also available as MIT Technical Memo
MIT/LCS/TM-373.
[15] N. A. Lynch, Distributed Algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann
Publishers, San Mateo, CA, 1996.
[16] J. E. Hopcroft and J. D. Ullman, Introduction to Automata
Theory, Languages, and Computation. Addison-Wesley,
1979.
[17] N. A. Lynch, “Input/output automata: Basic, timed, hybrid,
probabilistic, dynamic,” in Roberto M. Amadio, Denis Lugiez
(Eds.): Proceedings of 14th International Conference on
Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2003), Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 2761. Springer, 2003, pp. 187–188.
